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SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING IN
SOFTWARE PATENTS
Michael Xun Liu
Subject matter eligibility and functional claiming are considered
separate doctrines in patent law. Conceptually, subject matter
eligibility relates to the types of ideas that can be patented, whereas
limits on functional claiming constrain how patentees can claim
their inventions. In practice, however, patents that recite functional
claims are also more likely to be invalidated for failing to recite
patentable subject matter. This trend is especially prevalent in the
software field, where courts often hold the function or end result of
a computer program represents an unpatentable abstract idea.
Critics argue this judicial approach to software patents
improperly conflates “what is patentable” with “how patentees can
claim their inventions.” To rein in this practice, Congress has
introduced legislation that would narrow judicial authority over
patentable subject matter. The current legislative proposals,
however, do not address underlying policy issues surrounding
functional claims in software patents. They will also prevent courts
from invalidating patents that broadly preempt future innovation.
Instead of limiting judicial authority over patentable subject matter,
policymakers should address functional software claims more
directly, such as adopting a more flexible interpretation of meansplus-function claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) or delegating
rulemaking authority to the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern software can perform functions that few could imagine
in previous decades. A typical smartphone can run applications that
navigate drivers, pay for coffee, hail a rideshare, and even diagnose
diseases. Programmers should certainly have incentives to dream up
new ways to make life easier and work more productive. The hard
question for policymakers, however, is whether those incentives
should be in the form of patent rights and, if so, how extensive those
rights should be. In a world that depends on software at every turn,
it may seem inconceivable that basic questions about software
patentability remain unsettled. Yet the extent to which software is
patentable and the permissible scope of software claims are both still
hotly debated. While these questions have never been definitively
resolved, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International brought them squarely back into the limelight.1
The ensuing controversy has generated renewed calls for a
legislative solution to software patents.2

1

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014); see Jeffrey A.
Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section
101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, BERKELEY TECH. L. J.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 555), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050093.
2
See infra Section V.
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To understand why software patents pose unique challenges for
courts and legislators, it helps to start with a few foundational
concepts. Congress is constitutionally empowered to “promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing . . . inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”3 But
that does not mean all scientific advancements are patentable or
inventors own every aspect of their discovery. Courts and
policymakers have long recognized some patents do little to
promote scientific or technological progress and may even hinder
subsequent innovation.
First, most would agree that limits should exist for patentable
subject matter, which are the types of discoveries eligible for
patenting. For instance, natural laws and abstract ideas cannot be
patented.4 Thus, even the discoverer of groundbreaking ideas like
Bernoulli’s principle or the theory of relativity cannot claim the
exclusive use of those concepts.5 Second, even if the invention falls
within the realm of patentable subject matter, the law further
constrains the scope of the inventor’s resulting patent right.6 Ideally,
the inventor’s exclusive right should be commensurate with their
contribution to technology.7 Historically, one way courts limited
patent scope is by prohibiting attempts to claim the function of a
device or process.8 The rationale behind this prohibition is that
functional claims preclude others from developing new and different
ways of performing the same function.9
To illustrate these limits on patent eligibility and scope, consider
a hypothetical patent on an airplane. According to Bernoulli’s
principle, fast moving fluids exert lower pressure than slower
moving fluids.10 Using this principle, an airplane generates lift by
3

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
5
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
6
Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (“A claim broader
than the actual invention of the patentee is, for that very reason, upon the
principles of the common law, utterly void, and the patent is a nullity.”).
7
Id.
8
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1946).
9
Id.
10
BERNOULLI’S PRINCIPLE, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. 4 (2010),
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/ default/files/atoms/files/bernoulli_principle_k-4.pdf.
4
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forcing the air above its wing to travel faster than the air below its
wing.11 In this hypothetical, the inventor is the first person to learn
how to harness Bernoulli’s principle to generate lift, and she invents
a working propeller plane based on this understanding. Bernoulli’s
principle is a natural law that cannot be patented.12 An airplane,
however, is a machine that applies the natural law and therefore falls
within the realm of patent-eligible subject matter.13
Even though an airplane is patent-eligible, there are still limits
on how the inventor can claim her invention. For instance, our
hypothetical inventor might claim “a machine with a fuselage, fixed
wings, and a propeller” arranged in a specific way. This is an
accurate description of her invention because it covers the design
(i.e., a propeller plane) she created. Alternatively, the inventor might
claim “a machine with a fuselage and a means for applying
Bernoulli’s principle to fly.” From a technical and linguistic
perspective, this second claim is also an accurate description of her
invention. The difference, however, is the second claim is directed
to the function of an airplane, but not how it performs the function.
As a result, the literal scope of the second claim extends beyond
propeller planes or their obvious variants.14 Instead, the claim
language also covers totally different machines that apply
Bernoulli’s principle to fly, such as helicopters.
In theory, subject matter eligibility addresses what ideas can be
patented, and limits on functional claiming constrain how those
ideas can be patented. These issues are governed by separate
statutory provisions. In addressing subject matter eligibility, 35
U.S.C. § 101 states any “new or useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” is patentable.15 By contrast,
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) limits the scope of functional claims.16 Under
§ 112(f), if a patentee drafts a claim “as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof,” the claim will be construed to
11

Id. at 5.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
13
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
14
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1946).
15
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
16
Id. § 112(f).
12
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cover only what is disclosed in the specifications.17 That way, if a
patent describes a propeller plane but claims “a machine with a
fuselage and a means for applying Bernoulli’s principle to fly,”
§ 112(f) will limit the claim to propeller planes and their
equivalents.18
In reality, the distinction between “what is patentable?” and
“how can it be patented?” is not always so clear. We might say a
patent on “a machine that applies Bernoulli’s principle to fly” recites
a patent-eligible idea because it is directed to an airplane but claims
the idea in an impermissible manner because it is too broad. Some
might also argue the claim is too abstract to be patentable.19 That is
because it covers an idea for how Bernoulli’s principle can be used
without reciting any technical aspects of the machine’s design or
components.20 In other words, the claim is directed to the idea of
using a natural law in the technological environment of a “flying
machine,” but it does not cover any specific technology for actually
implementing the idea.21
Accordingly, the same claim might be abstract or functional
depending on how we frame the analysis. This distinction, however,
has real consequences. If a claim is abstract, then it is invalid.22 By
contrast, if the claim is non-abstract but functional, then its scope is

17

Id.
As the Federal Circuit explained in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC:
Congress struck a balance in allowing patentees to express a claim
limitation by reciting a function to be performed rather than by reciting
structure for performing that function, while placing specific constraints
on how such a limitation is to be construed, namely, by restricting the
scope of coverage to only the structure, materials, or acts described in
the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and
equivalents thereof.
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
19
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“[E]ssentially result–focused, functional character of claim language has been a
frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101 . . . .”).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1354 (“[L]imiting the claims to the particular technological
environment of power–grid monitoring is, without more, insufficient to transform
them into patent–eligible applications of the abstract idea at their core.”).
22
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014).
18
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limited to the “corresponding structure, material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof.”23
This distinction is particularly hard to make for software patents.
On a fundamental level, software can be characterized as a set of
instructions or algorithms, which the Supreme Court has held to be
abstract.24 Nevertheless, software is always embodied in some
physical form, whether it is stored in a computer readable medium
(i.e. a hard-drive) or running on an electronic device.25 As a result,
patentees often try to claim the implementation of software on
physical devices.26 For example, a typical software patent might
recite “a computer readable medium containing program
instructions” to perform a set of functions.27 Although this claim is
technically directed to a physical device, one could argue taking a
set of instructions and saying “apply it on a computer” is no less
abstract than the instructions themselves.
At the same time, software patents also raise functional claiming
issues. Software claims are rarely limited to specific code and are
usually directed to the software’s higher-level functions.28 Such
claims can preclude other programmers from writing different code
to perform the same function.29 Often, software patents are asserted
against later-developed programs that perform the claimed function
but operate in fundamentally different ways, thus raising concerns
that software patents hinder innovation or serve as tools for extorting
businesses through litigation.30
23

35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2011); see Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347.
Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the
Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399,
1455–56 (2013); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
25
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (“Nearly every computer will include a
‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the
basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method
claims.”).
26
Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 919–22.
27
Id. at 920.
28
Id. at 919–22.
29
See id. at 923.
30
See James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software Patent Crisis,
WASH. POST (Sep. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the–
24
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Despite uncertainty surrounding their validity and scope, the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) took a liberal approach to
software patents throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.31 Within that
time, the agency also issued many patents with functional claim
language.32 By 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
estimated over half of all issued patents were related to software.33
Moreover, software patents accounted for the majority of patent
lawsuit filings.34 Around the same time, another study concluded
most litigated patents used some form of functional claiming.35
This all changed in 2014 with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Alice v. CLS Bank,36 which dialed back software patents
significantly.37 In Alice, the Court held a computer-implemented
method of mitigating financial risk was not patent-eligible even
though the claims included hardware components. 38 After Alice,
lower courts frequently invalidated functional software claims under
§ 101.39 The Federal Circuit observed “the essentially resultfocused, functional character of claim language has been a frequent
feature of claims held ineligible under § 101.”40 In another decision,
the court referenced the “foundational patent law principle[] that a
result, even an innovative result, is not itself patentable.”41 Some
judges and practitioners, however, criticize these decisions for
switch/wp/2013/09/03/the–patent–troll–crisis–is–really–a–software–patent–
crisis/?utm_term=.8909c5855d14.
31
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 13 (2013).
32
See Colleen V. Chien & Aashish R. Karkhanis, Functional Claiming and
Software Patents, 40–41 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. L., Working Paper No. 06-13,
2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2215867.
33
Id.
34
Id.; Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with
Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (2016).
35
See Chien & Karkhanis, supra note 32, at 40–41.
36
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
37
See id. at 2360.
38
Id.
39
Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Case Change the Law
by Saying Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 774 (2018).
40
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
41
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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conflating distinct inquiries under § 101 and § 112.42 And Congress
has introduced legislative amendments that would prohibit courts
from considering any § 112 issues in the patent eligibility analysis.43
Although Alice brought judicial and Congressional attention to
software patents, the current debate over § 101 also reflects decadeslong concerns about the nature of software and how it should be
treated under patent law. In this Article, I show how judicial
concerns about functional software claims underpin the post-Alice
approach to software patent eligibility. I argue that differing
opinions on functional claiming help explain inconsistencies in the
Federal Circuit’s recent § 101 decisions. In particular, courts have
held that software functions are inherently abstract and ineligible.44
By contrast, others reason software functions are not abstract per se
and will look beyond the claim language to evaluate whether the
claimed software functions are tied to technological
improvements.45
I also explain why legislative proposals to amend § 101 should
address long-standing issues relating to functional software claims.
The current legislative proposals, however, largely fail to do so.
Instead, the leading proposals would prohibit courts and the PTO
from rejecting broad, functional software patents without resolving
underlying concerns about such patents, including their unclear
scope and potential to preempt subsequent innovation. I also identify
one proposal that, despite its flaws, has the potential to improve

42

See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N., AIPLA LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL AND REPORT ON PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 3–4 (2017)
[hereinafter
AIPLA
PROPOSAL],
https://www.aipla.org/docs/defaultsource/uploadedfiles/documents/resources2/reports/2017aipladirect/documents/a
ipla-report-on-101-reform-5-19-17-errata.pdf?sfvrsn=138c9ce7_1.
43
See Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, H.R. 6264,
115th Cong. § 7(c) (2d Sess. 2018); see also infra Section V.
44
See, e.g., Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266,
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
45
See Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1295; Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867
F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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uniformity and certainty for software patents.46 This proposal would
require courts to analyze functional software claims under
§ 112(f)—or a new provision to similar effect—instead of
invalidating the claims altogether.47 The caveat is it will require
guidelines on what types of disclosures are sufficient to support
functional software claiming. Institutionally, the PTO is likely better
suited to establish such guidelines.
This Article proceeds in five sections. Section II provides an
overview of the evolution of judicial limits on subject matter
eligibility and functional claiming through nineteenth century
judicial decisions. It also explains why the 1952 Patent Act included
a legislative compromise for functional claims. Section III shows
how software patents create conceptual difficulties for both patent
eligibility and functional claiming analysis. This section also
reviews how Congress and the courts tried—and failed—to develop
a uniform framework for analyzing the patentability of software.
Section IV discusses the judicial approach to software patents after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice. It shows how differing views
on the nature of software functions underpin the post-Alice approach
to software patent eligibility. Finally, Section V discusses the
implications for the proposed legislative reform of § 101.
II. BACKGROUND ON SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND
FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING
The exclusive right of an inventor “depends entirely upon the
provisions of the acts of Congress.”48 Perhaps counterintuitively, the
statutes provide little guidance on what is patentable.49 Congress has
46

See Benjamin C. Stasa & David C. Berry, Fixing Patent Eligibility by
Limiting Scope to Disclosed Embodiments, PATENTLYO (June 4, 2018),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/06/eligibility-disclosed-embodiments.html.
47
See id.
48
See William B. Whitney, Patentable Processes, 19 HARV. L. REV. 30, 30
(1905).
49
One author of the 1952 Patent Act commented:
While patents are creatures of statute, the entire body of patent law is
much fuller than the statute itself, including a vast amount of case
material on subjects such as invention and infringement which are dealt
with by the statute only in general terms. Consequently, a discussion of
the statute alone cannot be a complete dissertation on patent law.
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never explained the meaning of terms like “process” or “machine”
under § 101, nor has it delegated authority to the Patent Office to
interpret the patent statutes through regulation.50 As a result, most
substantive standards for patentability are judicially created.51
Indeed, U.S. patent law has largely been “built upon judicial
interpretation of elliptical statutory phrases, or is devoid of any
statutory basis whatsoever.”52
This section starts with nineteenth century judicial decisions that
still guide the modern judicial approach to patent eligibility and
functional claiming. Before the 1952 Patent Act, courts would
invalidate claims altogether if the claims were either abstract or
purely functional.53 That changed with the 1952 Patent Act, through
which Congress tried to soften the impact of functional claiming
under § 112(f).54 The idea was to allow functional claims, but limit
their scope to the specific embodiments disclosed in the patent.55
Courts, however, interpreted § 112(f) to cover only patents that
invoked this statutory provision through specific claim language.56
This approach allowed many patents, especially in the software
field, to use functional claim language without triggering the
narrowing effects of § 112(f).57
A. Common Law Origins
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, courts began to
distinguish between unpatentable “principles” and specific
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, reprinted in 75 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 161, 162 (1993).
50
See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated en banc on
other grounds, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
51
See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U.
L. REV. 51, 54 (2010).
52
Id.
53
See Lemley, supra note 26, at 914–15.
54
See id. at 915–16.
55
See id.
56
See Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2004), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339,
1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d
1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
57
Lemley, supra note 26, at 923–24.
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applications of such principles.58 In Le Roy v. Tatham,59 the Supreme
Court explained that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”60 By contrast,
“[a] new property discovered in matter, when practically applied, in
the construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture, is
patentable.”61 To illustrate this distinction, the Court explained that:
Through the agency of machinery a new steam power may be said to
have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power exclusively
to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said of electricity,
and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to all . . . .62

Around the same time, courts developed a closely related
doctrine to prohibit functional claiming. Early decisions often called
this the “function of the machine” doctrine, and this doctrine held
that machines could only be patented based on their components or
design, not on the result or effect of a machine’s operation.63 The
doctrine can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Corning v. Burden,64 where the court held an inventor could not
patent “the function of a machine, or the effect produced by it on the
material subjected to the action of the machine.”65 The Court
reasoned the scope of functional claims exceeds the inventor’s
contribution to the technical field.66 That is, functional claim
language allows the inventor to “describe a machine which will
perform a certain function, and then claim the function itself, and all
other machines that may be invented to perform the same
function.”67
Historically, the distinction between functional claiming and
subject matter eligibility has never been clear. Nineteenth century
58

Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852); Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723,
727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840).
59
Le Roy, 55 U.S. 156.
60
Id. at 175.
61
Id. (emphasis added).
62
Id.
63
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1853).
65
Id. at 268.
66
See id.
67
Id. at 269.
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cases that invalidate patents for reciting abstract principles are often
based, at least in part, on functional claim language.68 This is partly
because the distinction between functional claiming and subject
matter eligibility was hardly significant at that time. Before the 1952
Patent Act, courts would invalidate patents if they claimed either
“the function of a machine” or ineligible subject matter. 69 For
example, in Wyeth v. Stone, the court invalidated a claim that
covered any machine for cutting ice.70 Justice Story, riding circuit,
reasoned that “[n]o man can have a right to cut ice by all means and
methods.”71 Although a machine that cuts ice is neither an abstract
principle nor a natural law, Justice Story nevertheless characterized
the claim as “an art or principle in the abstract” because it did not
relate to “any particular method or machinery” for cutting ice.72
Even in the renowned case of O’Reilly v. Morse,73 it is not
entirely clear how much weight the Supreme Court placed on
functional claiming concerns.74 There, the Supreme Court held
Samuel Morse could not patent the use of electric current to generate
characters or signs at a remote location, which is the principle
behind the telegraph.75 Morse’s patent recited the following
invention:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of
machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the
essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric
or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed
for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any
distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to be
the first inventor or discoverer.76

As his patent makes explicit, Morse tried to claim the use of
electromagnetism to generate intelligible characters at a distance,
68

See, e.g., Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840); O’Reilly
v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
69
Wyeth, 30 F. Cas. at 727; Lemley, supra note 26, at 914–15.
70
Wyeth, 30 F. Cas. at 727.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
74
See generally id.
75
See id. at 113.
76
Id. at 112.
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not just a specific machine for doing so.77 The Supreme Court
observed that the claim would give Morse the “exclusive right to
every improvement where the motive power is the electric or
galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters at a distance.”78 Morse’s patent could be
asserted against future inventors who “discover[ed] a mode of
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic
current, without using any part of the process or combination set
forth in the plaintiff’s specification.”79 As a result, the Court held
that Morse’s “claim is too broad, and not warranted by law.”80
O’Reilly v. Morse remains a cornerstone of judicial
interpretations of patentable subject matter.81 It is cited in numerous
Supreme Court decisions on patent eligibility, usually for the
proposition that scientific principles cannot be patented.82 The
Federal Circuit has likewise described O’Reilly v. Morse as a patent
eligibility case.83 But is this characterization accurate? Samuel
Morse tried to patent the use of electromagnetism in telegraphy.
Electromagnetism does not fit within any of the categories of patenteligible subject matter. Nor is electromagnetism “new,” since it
existed in nature long before Samuel Morse harnessed its power to
transmit messages. But Morse’s patent recites more than the bare
principles of electromagnetism. Samuel Morse applied
electromagnetism to generate characters at a remote location, which
is a phenomenon that does not occur in nature and cannot exist
77

See id.
Id.
79
Id. at 113.
80
Id.
81
See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 85 (2012); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972).
82
See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354; Mayo, 566 U.S. at 85; Parker, 437 U.S.
at 592; Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68.
83
See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2018); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1309 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2016); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
78
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without human ingenuity.84 Further, converting electrical impulses
to legible characters is plainly a “process,” at least in common
parlance.85
Viewed this way, the rationale in Morse is more consistent with
the judicial prohibition against functional claiming. Morse’s patent
was directed to the function of generating characters at a distance
using electricity without regard to the specific machine or process
for doing so. The Court explained that “[i]f this claim can be
maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the result
is accomplished.”86 Future inventors might develop a device that is
“less complicated[,] . . . less expensive in construction, and in its
operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could
not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission
of this patentee.”87 Indeed, the Supreme Court upheld different
claims in Morse’s patent that limited the claimed method to the
process described in patent specifications.88
Aside from its tendency to blur into a subject matter eligibility
analysis, the judicial bar on functional claims presented other
conceptual difficulties as it evolved in the nineteenth century. First,
there is tension between the prohibition on functional claiming and
how courts interpret process patents. In O’Reilly v. Morse, the
Supreme Court observed that Morse’s patent improperly preempts
future machines from performing the claimed process of generating
84

See Morse, 56 U.S. 62.
See Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1320
(2012) (summarizing early American process patents); see also Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (“If [a process is] new and useful, it is just as
patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an
art.”).
86
Morse, 56 U.S. at 113.
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., id. at 112 (“We perceive no well–founded objection to the
description which is given of the whole invention and its separate parts, nor to his
right to a patent for the first seven inventions set forth in the specification of his
claims.”). The Supreme Court’s later decision in the Telephone Cases support this
interpretation. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 8 S. Ct. 778, 785 (1888) (upholding
Alexander Graham Bell’s patent on a process of transmitting speech using
electricity because the claim was limited to the particular process discussed in the
patent).
85
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characters at a distance using electromagnetism.89 But all process
patents preempt others from using different machines to achieve the
same result, including innovative machines that might perform the
same process faster and cheaper.90 In Cochrane v. Deener,91 the
Supreme Court found the defendants infringed a process patent for
manufacturing flour, despite using a different machine.92 The Court
noted “a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular
form of the instrumentalities used” and “[i]f one of the steps of a
process be that a certain substance is to be reduced to a powder, it
may not be at all material what instrument or machinery is used to
effect that object, whether a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a
mill.”93
Second, the notion of what constitutes a functional claim can be
elusive.94 Even structural components are defined by their function
to some extent.95 Suppose that, in my hypothetical example of an
airplane patent, the inventor claims “a flying machine with a
fuselage, two wings, and a propeller.” At first glance, nothing about
this claim seems “functional,” as it apparently describes the physical
components of a propeller plane. But in reality, whether this claim
is functional depends on how the patent defines the term “propeller.”
Conceivably, the patent might broadly define the term as “a device
that propels,” in which case the claim would still cover future
innovations such as jet engines and other innovative means of
propelling a plane. Even common definitions of “propeller” still
include functional aspects. For instance, Merriam-Webster defines
the term “propeller” as a device with rotating blades that “forms part
89

Morse, 56 U.S. at 113.
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 (1876).
91
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
92
Id. at 787–90.
93
Id. at 787–88.
94
Application of Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 263 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (“One of the
primary problems we have in coming to grips with the instant rejection is in what
sense the word ‘functional’ is being used. Few words in patent law have acquired
more diverse meanings than the word ‘functional.’”).
95
B. L. Zangwill, Comments on Means Claims and Expressions, 34 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 36, 36 (1952) (“[T]here is little, if anything, to guide us as to where
‘structure’ ends and ‘function’ begins, or even why one is always to be preferred
to the other.”).
90
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of a helical surface and that is used to propel a vehicle.”96
Nevertheless, terms like “propeller” usually connote a minimum
level of structure, even if such terms have functional aspects as
well.97 As described in Section III, however, such structural
elements fall away entirely for software.98
By the early twentieth century, courts shifted towards a
somewhat different rationale for invalidating functional claims.
Rather than focusing on how functional claims tie up natural laws
or abstract ideas, courts reasoned that functional claims do not
define the scope of the invention with adequate clarity.99 This
reasoning is based on a long-standing patent law doctrine commonly
known as definiteness.100 As early as the Patent Act of 1790, patents
were required to describe the invention and “distinguish the
invention or discovery from other things before known and used.”101
Similarly, the Patent Act of 1870 required claims that “particularly
point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination
which he claims as his invention or discovery . . . .”102
In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,103 the
Supreme Court relied on the definiteness requirement to hold that
patents cannot claim an invention “in terms of what it will do rather
than in terms of its own physical characteristics or its arrangement
in the new combination apparatus.”104 By claiming the invention in
terms of “what it will do,” the Court found functional claiming
undermines at least three policies rationales for the definiteness
requirement:
1. That the Government may know what they have granted and what will
become public property when the term of the monopoly expires.
Propeller, MERRIAM–WEBSTER (emphasis added), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/propeller (last visited Aug. 8, 2018).
97
See Lemley, supra note 26, at 960.
98
See infra § III.B.
99
See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946);
Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256–57 (1928).
100
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124–25 (2014).
101
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 110.
102
William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims,
46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 760 (1948).
103
Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 9.
104
Id. at 9.
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2. That licensed persons desiring to practice the invention may know,
during the term, how to make, construct, and use the invention.
3. That other inventors may know what part of the field of invention is
unoccupied.105

As a result, the claim in Halliburton was not invalidated because
it was abstract, but because it failed to adequately describe the scope
of the invention.106 Stated otherwise, the Court found that functional
claims fail to meet a notice requirement.107 Although Halliburton
was understood to have ended the practice of functional claiming,
this prohibition on functional claiming would soon be legislatively
abrogated by the 1952 Patent Act.108
B. The 1952 Patent Act
In 1926, Congress started to codify the laws of the United States
into fifty titles according to subject matter, which ultimately
produced the United States Code.109 The 1952 Patent Act was part
of this “comprehensive program of revising and enacting into law
all of the titles of the United States Code.”110 Congress, however,
went beyond codifying existing patent statutes and judicial
decisions; it also revised patent law in several important respects.111
Among other changes, the 1952 Patent Act divided patentable
subject matter and novelty into two statutory sections: § 101 and
§ 102, respectively.112 The law also created § 103, which states that
only non-obvious inventions can be patented.113
105

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
107
Id.
108
Lemley, supra note 26, at 915.
109
Detailed Guide to the United States Code, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION
COUNSEL, http://uscode.house.gov/detailed_guide.xhtml (last visited July 31,
2018).
110
H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 1 (1952) (Conf. Rep.).
111
Federico, supra note 49, at 164.
112
Id. at 176.
113
L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the
Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 671–72 (1955); H.R. REP. NO.
1923, at 7 (1952) (Conf. Rep.) (“An invention which has been made, and which
is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not be
patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was known before is
not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent.”).
106
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The 1952 Patent Act, however, did not substantively alter the
statutory language regarding patentable subject matter. Section 101
provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . . .”114
Compared to prior versions, the 1952 Patent Act replaced the term
“art” with “process.”115 This change was not meant to be substantive
because the term “art” had already “been interpreted by the courts
as being practically synonymous with process or method.”116 The
statute did, however, explicitly define “process” to include “a new
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or material.”117 The purpose for including this definition was
to abrogate case law that cast doubt on whether new uses of existing
compounds or devices are patentable.118 By revising the definition
of “process” to include new uses of existing processes or machines,
Congress made clear that new uses of existing processes or
machines would fall within the realm of patent-eligible subject
matter.119
Congress also liberalized the use of functional claims. In
Halliburton, the Supreme Court held patents cannot claim the
invention “in terms of what it will do.”120 Although this decision was
largely consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedents,121 it drove
Congress to craft legislation that would allow functional claiming
while also addressing the Court’s concerns about the scope of such
claims.122 Under the 1952 Patent Act, paragraph six of § 112 states:
114

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Id. at Reviser Notes.
116
Id.
117
35 U.S.C § 100(b) (2012); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269,
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The 1952 Act shows that the ‘primary significance’ of
adding Section 100(b) was to make clear that a method was not ‘vulnerable to
attack, on the ground of not being within the field of patentable subject
matter . . . .’”) (internal citations omitted).
118
CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1294–95.
119
Federico, supra note 49, at 175–77.
120
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946).
121
See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256–57
(1928) (listing Supreme Court precedents regarding patentable subject matter).
122
Federico, supra note 49, at 186.
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An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.123

As the statute makes clear, a claim may cover a function without
reciting a structure, material or act to support it. The caveat,
however, is “such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.”124 In other words, a patentee
can use functional language, but the claim will be limited to
whatever components or devices disclosed in the patent.
Accordingly, an inventor who makes a propeller plane can still
claim “a machine with a fuselage, wheels, and a means for flying.”
Under § 112, the claim is not invalid even though “means for flying”
is functional. Courts will, however, limit the claim’s scope to the
propeller plane and its equivalents.125 That way, the inventor cannot
assert her patent against future inventors who create different
“means for flying.”
III. THE CHALLENGE OF SOFTWARE PATENTS
As Congress crafted 1952 Patent Act, a technological revolution
was already afoot.126 In 1946, scientists at the University of
Pennsylvania designed the first general-purpose digital computer,
called the ENIAC.127 The same year Congress passed the 1952
Patent Act, scientists at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

123

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2011) [hereinafter § 112(f)]. The America Invents Act
reorganized Section 112, and paragraph six is now codified under subsection (f).
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The
wording of this statutory subsection remains unchanged.
124
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2011).
125
See id. (explaining that a functional claim limitation shall be “construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification
and equivalents thereof”).
126
David Bender, Computer Programs: Should They be Patentable, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 241, 243–44 (1968).
127
Frank da Cruz, Programming the ENIAC, COLUM. U. COMPUTING HIST.
(Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/eniac.html.
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created MANIAC I, a computer that could function on stored
programs instead of hard-wired circuitry.128
Software and general-purpose computers present difficult issues
for patent eligibility. Unlike mechanical or chemical processes,
software does not cause a physical transformation such as the
creation of a new machine or chemical compound. Instead,
computer programs manipulate data and signals. And, unlike
traditional machines, most computer functions are untethered to
their specific hardware configurations.129 General-purpose
computers usually have a fairly standard set of components like a
central processing unit and memory units, and most software
programs will run on any standard hardware configuration.130
When drafting the 1952 Act, Congress likely could not have
predicted the impact of digital computers, or how difficult it would
be to fit them under the existing patent jurisprudence. Accordingly,
the law did not include any provisions to address software patents.
But, not long after the 1952 Patent Act became law, software began
to fundamentally change the paradigm for how machines function.
Since then, courts have looked for a workable approach to assess the
patentability of computer programs. This search has shaped the
modern judicial approach to both patent eligibility and functional
claiming.
A. Patent Eligibility of Software Patents
By the mid-1960s, computer technology was becoming
ubiquitous, and policymakers started to recognize the difficult issues
it created for patent law. In 1965, President Johnson established a
commission to address emerging issues raised by “complex and
rapidly changing technology” and make recommendations for
reforming the patent system.131 The Commission proposed
128

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194 n.1 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
General Purpose Computer, INST. FOR TELECOMM. SCIS.,
https://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-017/_2452.htm (last visited Aug. 10,
2018).
130
Computer Hardware, STAN. U., https://web.stanford.edu/class/cs101/
hardware-1.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2018).
131
Order Establishing the President’s Commission on the Patent System, 30
Fed. Reg. 4661 (1965).
129
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amending the Patent Act to categorically exclude software from
patenting. Under the Committee’s proposal:
A series of instructions which control or condition the operation of a data
processing machine, generally referred to as a “program,” shall not be
considered patentable regardless of whether the program is claimed as:
(a) an article, (b) a process described in terms of the operations
performed by a machine pursuant to a program, or (c) one or more
machine configurations established by a program. 132

The Commission noted “[u]ncertainty now exists as to whether
the statute permits a valid patent to be granted on programs.”133 And
it advocated against software patents in part because “the creation
of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in
the absence of patent protection and that copyright protection for
programs is presently available.”134 The Commission’s
recommended fix would not only preclude claiming programs in the
abstract, but would also exclude claims on programmable devices
built for specific tasks.
Based on the Commission’s recommendations, Congress
introduced the Patent Reform Act of 1967, which would have
amended the 1952 Act by adding § 106, titled “Computer programs
not patentable.”135 This proposed amendment stated “[a] plan of
action or set of operating instructions, in whatever form presented,
to cause a controllable data processor or computer to perform
selected operations shall not be patentable.”136 Echoing the
recommendation of the Commission’s Report, this statutory
amendment would have eliminated patent protection for software
entirely.
132

STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., REP. ON THE
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS. 20 (1966).
133
Id. at 21.
134
Id.
135
Bender, supra note 126, at 241–42; Donald W. Banner, The Recent Proposal
to Change the United States Patent System, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 873, 876 (1968);
Patent Law Revision, Hearings on S.2, S. 1042, S. 1377 and S. 1691 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 9 (1967) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights) [hereinafter Patent Law
Revision Hearings].
136
See Bender, supra note 126, at 241–42.
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Not surprisingly, the nascent software industry vigorously
opposed a categorical prohibition on patenting computer programs.
Some argued it would be illogical to distinguish between traditional
machines controlled by hardware and machines controlled by “a
complex set of coded electrical impulses.”137 For example, the
president of Applied Data Research, one of the largest software
vendors at the time, testified that “a machine containing a
programmed control system is the same in all features as that
containing special purpose hardware controls.”138 The Chamber of
Commerce argued “[f]urther study should be given to alternative
solutions for determining what is and what is not patentable in the
field of computer software, instead of immediately removing a vast
new body of technology from patent consideration.”139 And the
Commerce Department noted the difficulty of defining “computer
program” and argued that a legislative exclusion for computer
programs would be premature.140 Those opposing the amendment
ultimately prevailed, and, despite holding extensive hearings on the
proposed amendments, Congress did not pass the 1967 Patent
Reform Act.
Without a legislative solution, courts were left to grapple with
computer programs on a case-by-case basis. In Gottschalk v.
Benson, the Supreme Court held that a method of converting binary
coded decimals to pure binary numerals was not patent-eligible.141
Because the claims covered an algorithm in the abstract, the court
observed “the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm
itself.”142 The Court also stressed how “[t]he mathematical
procedures can be carried out in existing computers long in use, no

137

Patent Law Revision Hearings, supra note 135, at 751–53 (statement of
Richard C. Jones, President of Applied Data Research Inc.).
138
See id. at 751.
139
Id. at 454 (statement of George F. Metcalf on behalf of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States).
140
Id. at 724 (statement of Pedro R. Vazquez for the General Counsel of the
U.S. Department of Commerce).
141
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
142
Id. at 72.
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new machinery being necessary. And, as noted, they can also be
performed without a computer.”143
Intuitively, the Court’s holding that algorithms are abstract
makes sense. After all, someone could use a pen and paper to
perform decimal conversions or perhaps even make the calculations
in their head. The more challenging question is whether specific
computer implementations of software algorithms are patenteligible. For example, could someone patent a method of using a
computer to run an algorithm that pools mutual funds into an
investment portfolio?144 Because it runs on computer hardware, this
patent might be less abstract than a method for converting binary
signals to decimal. Arguably, however, the only “innovative” aspect
of the claimed invention is the abstract idea of pooling mutual funds,
not the computer that runs it.
Until recently, the Supreme Court’s approach to specific
implementations of software algorithms was unclear and
inconsistent. In Parker v. Flook, the Court held that using an
algorithm to automatically adjust variables in a chemical reaction
was not patent-eligible.145 In doing so, the court rejected the notion
that “if a process application implements a principle in some specific
fashion, it automatically falls within the patentable subject matter of
§ 101.”146 Yet the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in
Diamond v. Diehr, where the Court held that applying a
mathematical equation to the process of curing rubber was patenteligible.147 Even though the physical steps in the claimed process
were well-known, the Court characterized the claim as a “process
for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula.”148 Flook and Diehr seemingly reached
143

Id. at 67.
See, e.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (upholding patent on computerized accounting
system for managing mutual funds), abrogated by Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
600 (2010) (invalidating patent for computer implemented method of hedging risk
in commodity markets).
145
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978).
146
Id. at 593.
147
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981).
148
Id. at 191.
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opposite conclusions about whether implementing an algorithm in a
specific application is patent-eligible, and the tension between the
two cases has been extensively examined in the legal literature.149
Given this muddled Supreme Court guidance, lower courts took
a fairly liberal approach to software patents. For its part, the Federal
Circuit held an abstract method implemented on a generic computer
is patent-eligible because it produces “a useful, concrete and
tangible result.”150 Under this approach, the court found a computerimplemented method for pooling mutual funds was patentable
because it transforms “data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by
a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final
share price.”151 The Federal Circuit’s approach helped fuel a sharp
rise in software patenting that started in the 1990s and continued into
the 2000s.152 By 2011, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) estimated over half of all issued patents were related to
software.153 The same GAO study also found software patents
accounted for more than half of all patent lawsuit filings.154
B. Functional Claiming in Software Patents
At the same time, the judicial approach to functional claiming
under § 112 also promoted the growth of software patents. Section
112(f) applies to claims that express an element “as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,

149
See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
inevitable confusion these decisions would create, and urging the Court to adopt
an “unequivocal holding that no program–related invention is a patentable process
under § 101 unless it makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent entirely
on the utilization of a computer”); John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr
Says Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter,
82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765 (2014).
150
State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
151
Id.
152
Hylton, supra note 34, at 1125–26.
153
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 13 (2013).
154
Id.; Hylton, supra note 34, at 1126.
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material, or acts in support thereof.”155 Until recently, the Federal
Circuit took this language quite literally. That is, § 112(f)
presumably did not apply unless the patent recited the terms “means
for” or “step for.”156 As the court explained, “[w]hen the claim
drafter has not signaled his intent to invoke § 112 [(f)], by using the
term ‘means,’ we are unwilling to apply that provision without a
showing that the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can
be construed as structure.”157
At first glance, software patents may not seem functional
because they recite hardware components and software constructs.
These limitations, however, often fail to constrain software patents
beyond the claimed functions. A typical software patent might claim
“a computer readable medium for performing a set of functions.”158
The problem is “computer readable medium” does not impose any
meaningful constraint on claim scope.159 Software runs on
computers, so it is always stored on a computer readable medium.
Likewise, software patents often recite limitations that look
structural but are actually purely functional. For example, the patent
in Finjan v. Secure Computing Corporation covered a “system
comprising . . . an interface . . . , a comparator . . . , and a logical
engine.”160 Terms like “interface” and “comparator” have no
structural aspect whatsoever and are software constructs that are
defined entirely by their function.161
Although claims like “server comprising an interface and a
logical engine” might cover function, they do not recite “means for”
or “step for.” Without these talismanic words, courts often refused
to find the claims invoked § 112(f).162 As a result, software patents
155

35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2011).
Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2004), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339,
1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Flo Healthcare, 697 F.3d at 1374.
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See Lemley, supra note 26, at 919–22.
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Id.
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Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1204 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
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Id. at 1204.
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Lemley, supra note 26, at 923–24.
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would often claim broad functions while avoiding the narrowing
effect of § 112(f).163 One study found every software patent asserted
by non-practicing entities used some variety of functional language,
and half of all software patents litigated by other companies used
functional claiming as well.164 Functional claiming also allows
patentees to assert software patents against later developed
technology. As a result, some have argued “software patents
circumvent[] the limits the 1952 Act places on functional
claiming.”165
In 2015, partly in response to the proliferation of functional
claiming in software, the Federal Circuit abandoned the “[strong]
presumption that a limitation lacking the word ‘means’ is not subject
to § 112 [(f)].”166 In Williamson v. Citrix Online,167 the court
observed its presumption “is unwarranted, is uncertain in meaning
and application, and has the inappropriate practical effect of placing
a thumb on what should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale.”168
Instead, the court announced the standard for applying § 112 should
be “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of
ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the
name for structure.”169
After Williamson, courts seem more willing to find that software
patents invoke means plus function under § 112. For instance, the
Federal Circuit held “compliance mechanism” and “symbol
generator” were both means-plus-function limitations, even though
the claims never used the term “means.”170 Williamson, however, did
not eliminate functional software claims altogether.171 District courts
163
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Chien & Karkhanis, supra note 32, at 40–41.
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Lemley, supra note 26, at 928.
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Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Id. at 1349.
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Id.
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See Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d
1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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lntellicheck Mobilisa, Inc. v. Wizz Sys., LLC, 2016 WL 1182150, at *19
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2016), Finjan, Inc., v. Proofpoint, Inc., 2015 WL 7770208,
at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015).
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have held that terms like “content processor for processing content”
and “circuitry . . . for receiving the information” are not functional
claims under § 112(f), even though the hardware in the claim
imposes no meaningful limits on claim scope.172
Regardless, any change wrought by Williamson has been
eclipsed by the Supreme Court’s Alice v. CLS Bank decision.173 The
court in Alice ruled a generic computer implementation of a business
method was a patent-ineligible abstract concept.174 After Alice,
courts will often invalidate functional software claims altogether
before reaching the § 112(f) inquiry. In some ways, the expansion
of the abstract idea exception under Alice has now subsumed the
functional claiming inquiry.
IV. LIMITING SOFTWARE PATENTS UNDER SECTION 101
By the start of the twenty-first century policymakers were
expressing greater skepticism about software patents.175 Those
opposed to software patents argued such patents disclosed nothing
innovative, had unclear scope, and hampered innovation.176 Critics
also focused on businesses that licensed and litigated patents as their
exclusive source of revenue.177 In 2011, these so called nonpracticing entities, or “patent trolls,” sued over 5,000 firms at an
estimated cost of over $29 billion.178
In response, Congress and courts tried to address these perceived
abuses of the patent system. In 2011, Congress passed the America
Invents Act (AIA), which created several administrative procedures
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that made it easier to challenge patents at the PTO.179 Around the
same time, both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court took an
increasingly narrow view of patentable subject matter, particularly
as it relates to software.180 Of these decisions, the most important for
software patents is Alice, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
method of mitigating financial risk on a computer.181 In doing so, the
court adopted a two-step framework for patent eligibility.182 The first
step asks whether the patent is directed to an abstract idea or other
judicial exception to patentable subject matter.183 If it does, then the
court moves on to step two, where it determines whether the claim
recites an “inventive concept.”184
Shortly before the Supreme Court decided Alice, Professor Mark
Lemley cautioned “the current trend is one that would invalidate a
wide swath of software patent claims, particularly functional claims
. . . [,] not because they are too broad, or indefinite, but because they
are not the sort of thing that is patentable at all.”185 Four years after
Alice, this warning seems prescient. Under Alice step one, courts
frequently hold software functions are unpatentable abstract ideas.186
The Federal Circuit even stated it was a “foundational patent law
principle[] that a result, even an innovative result, is not itself
patentable.”187 So in many cases, functional software claims are no
longer narrowed under § 112(f), but are instead invalidated under
§ 101.
There is an ongoing debate about whether this approach to
software patents helps or hinders innovation. However, the growing
179
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consensus is the two-step process for evaluating patent eligibility
fails to provide sufficient clarity for lower courts, the PTO, and
practitioners.188 This section does not attempt to resolve the decadeslong debate about software patents, nor does it advocate for a new
interpretation of § 101. It will, however, clarify the court’s approach
to functional software claims, which is critical to understanding the
rationale underlying post-Alice judicial decisions. In particular, this
section explains how courts cannot agree on whether software
functions are inherently abstract. Some decisions hold if software
claims use purely functional language, then they fail § 101
regardless of what the specification discloses.189 By contrast, other
opinions do not automatically condemn functional software
claims.190 Instead, they look to the patent specification to determine
if the claimed software functions rely on a patent-eligible
technological solution.191
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A. The Alice/Mayo Two-Step Framework
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Alice is commonly understood
as a turning point for software patentability. While that may be true,
Alice also represents the culmination of decades-long concerns
regarding the proliferation of software patents, which were
increasingly viewed as hampering innovation and exacting a toll on
business. For its part, Congress passed the America Invents Act
(“AIA”) in 2011, which created new administrative procedures to
make challenging overbroad patents easier.192
The AIA, however, did not change any substantive requirements
for patentability.193 Even without a legislative amendment to § 101,
the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that tightened patent
eligibility standards.194 In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court
rejected the notion that a claimed process was patent-eligible so long
as it was “tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or “transforms
a particular article into a different state or thing.”195 The Court noted
that while this “may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating
processes similar to those in the Industrial Age . . . , there are reasons
to doubt whether the test should be the sole criterion for determining
the patentability of inventions in the Information Age.”196
The trend towards stricter patent eligibility standards continued
in Mayo v. Prometheus, where the Supreme Court invalidated
claims directed to a method for determining the proper dosage of a
drug by measuring a specific biomarker.197 Mayo is also the first case
where the Court expressly adopted a two-step framework for
determining patent eligibility. At step one, courts ask whether the
claim as a whole is directed to a patent-ineligible concept.198 If the
claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the court
192
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proceeds to step two, where it searches for “an ‘inventive concept,’
sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”199
Because Mayo involved a method of detecting a biomarker and
adjusting drug dosage, its impact on computer and software patents
was not immediately clear. In Alice, however, the Supreme Court
confirmed Mayo’s two step approach applied to computer and
software patents as well.200 There, the Court held that implementing
a method of mitigating financial risk on a generic computer is not
patent-eligible.201 Applying the two-step inquiry first announced in
Mayo, the Court found the claimed financial method was an abstract
idea at step one.202 “[T]he claims . . . are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk,” observed the Court.203 And “the concept of
intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long
prevalent in our system of commerce.’”204
At step two, the court held that applying an abstract idea on a
computer was not sufficient to make that idea patent-eligible.205
While recognizing that claims directed to a machine or computerreadable medium are “formally addressed to patent-eligible subject
matter,” the Court nevertheless held that “the mere recitation of a
generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention.”206 “Stating an abstract idea while
adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines those
two steps, with the same deficient result.”207
Notably, the analysis in Alice echoes earlier decisions on
functional claiming. For instance, although the claims recited
hardware such as “data processing system” and “communications

199

Id.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014).
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 2356.
204
Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)).
205
Id. at 2357.
206
Id. at 2358.
207
Id.
200

258

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 227

controller,” the Court noted these components are “purely functional
and generic.” 208 The Court explained:
Nearly every computer will include a “communications controller” and
“data storage unit” capable of performing the basic calculation, storage,
and transmission functions required by the method claims. As a result,
none of the hardware recited by the system claims “offers a meaningful
limitation beyond generally linking ‘the use of the [method] to a
particular technological environment,’ that is, implementation via
computers.”209

After Alice, lower courts have generally held that claims reciting
an abstract idea or algorithm implemented on a generic computer
are ineligible for patenting.210 One of the first post-Alice decisions
from the Federal Circuit was buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., in which
the court invalidated a software patent directed to a “machinereadable media encoded to perform steps for guaranteeing a party’s
performance of its online transaction.”211 The court found “[t]he
claims’ invocation of computers adds no inventive concept” and
“[t]he computer functionality is generic.”212 And the court
emphasized that narrowing the claim to use in a computer is at best
an “‘attempt[] to limit the use of the abstract guarantee idea ‘to a
particular technological environment,’ which has long been held
insufficient to save a claim in this context.”213
Some decisions go beyond finding that abstract ideas
implemented on generic computers are ineligible, and they will even
invalidate claims that recite specific devices or components under
§ 101.214 For example, the patent in In re TLI related “a method and
system for taking, transmitting, and organizing digital images.” 215
Although some claims required “tangible components such as ‘a
telephone unit’ and a ‘server,’” the Federal Circuit determined “the
208
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recited physical components merely provide a generic environment
in which to carry out the abstract idea of classifying and storing
digital images in an organized manner.”216
B. Software Patents After Alice
The overall impact of Alice on computer and software patents is
significant. One study found the Federal Circuit invalidated patents
in 90% of patent eligibility cases involving information
technology.217 For PTO reviews of covered business patents, which
often involve software implementation of business methods, over
95% of all § 101 decisions resulted in patent invalidity.218 In a
concurring opinion, Judge Mayer urged his colleagues on the
Federal Circuit “to acknowledge that Alice sounded the death knell
for software patents.”219 He argued software “is inherently abstract
because it is merely ‘an idea without physical embodiment[.]’ Given
that an ‘idea’ is not patentable, and a generic computer is ‘beside the
point’ in the eligibility analysis, all software implemented on a
standard computer should be deemed categorically outside the
bounds of § 101.”220
Does Judge Mayer accurately claim that post-Alice, all software
is ineligible under § 101? At least for now, the Federal Circuit has
carved out a space for software patents that claim improvements in
computer functionality. That is, the court distinguishes between
improvements in computer technology itself, which remain
patentable, and new functions of a conventional computer, which
are ineligible.221
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To illustrate, consider the patent in Enfish v. Microsoft, which
claimed a new logical model for a computer database.222 The Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to invalidate the patent
under § 101.223 In doing so, the court stressed Alice did not “broadly
hold that all improvements in computer-related technology are
inherently abstract,” and “some improvements in computer-related
technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not
abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, and the like.”224
The Court further noted “[s]oftware can make non-abstract
improvements to computer technology just as hardware
improvements can.”225 Thus, the relevant question is “whether the
claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality
versus being directed to an abstract idea.”226 Turning to the patent at
issue, the court held the claims were “specifically directed to a selfreferential table for a computer database” that offered “increased
flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory requirements”
over conventional computer databases.227
Nevertheless, it can be difficult to distinguish between
“improvements in computer technology” and “new functions of
generic computers.” Under the Federal Circuit’s standard, if a
programmer writes an algorithm that makes a smartphone run faster
or use less memory, then she has improved the computer’s
functionality.228 By contrast, if the programmer develops an
application that allows a smartphone to perform new tasks, she is
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likely implementing an abstract idea on generic components.229
Arguably, however, a smartphone that functions as a payment
device and a navigation tool is also an “improvement” over a device
that only browses the Internet, even if the underlying hardware
remains unchanged. Consider two cases:
1. Many commuters might prefer to pay their subway fare with
a bank or credit card. The problem, however, is verifying bankcard
transactions takes time, which inevitably creates delays in busy
subway terminals.230 In Smart Systems, the patentee solved this
problem by storing a list of preapproved bank cards at each
terminal.231 That way, individual terminals can quickly determine
whether a bank card is associated with a preapproved transit account
by referencing the locally stored list.232
2. Network service providers need to monitor and account for
the online activity of devices on their network.233 But receiving and
processing every device’s network activity at a central server
requires a lot of computational power and memory.234 In Amdocs,
the patentee claimed a system that records the activity of each
networked device at or near the device’s location.235 This “reduces
the storage and computational resource requirements” for the central
server.236
The Federal Circuit reached different results in these two cases.
In Smart Systems, the court invalidated a patent for verifying
payments at a subway terminal.237 In doing so, the court
characterized the invention as “directed to the collection, storage,
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and recognition of data.”238 Accordingly, the focus of the claims was
not “‘on the specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities.’”239 Instead, the “computers are invoked merely as a
tool” to carry out the claimed function.240 In Amdocs, however, the
court upheld a patent on a system of tracking network activity.241
There, the court reasoned the claim aimed to solve the technological
problem of “massive record flows” by applying the technological
solution of “enhancing data in a distributed fashion.”242
Are Amdocs and Smart Systems consistent with one another?
Arguably, the patent in Smart Systems describes improvements in
computer functionality. By storing a preapproved list of bank cards,
the patent avoids network latency by verifying bank and credit card
payments at transit terminals.243 The court, however, characterized
the claim as “the collection of financial data from third parties, the
storing of that financial data, linking proffered credit cards to the
financial data, and allowing access to a transit system based on the
financial data.”244 But, as the dissent points out, this characterization
arguably misses the “heart of the invention,” which is overcoming
the network latency that hinders the “use of conventional bankcards
to access mass transit.”245
Perhaps we can distinguish Amdocs from Smart Systems because
monitoring network traffic seems more “technical” than storing a
list of preapproved bank and credit cards. A human being can check
bank-card numbers against a preapproved list at a subway terminal,
however tedious or impracticable the task may be. However, no
human can monitor network traffic without a computer. The
problem with this reasoning is Amdocs did not involve a patent that
actually claimed a technical solution for monitoring network

238

Id. at 1372.
Id. (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016)).
240
Id.
241
Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1291.
242
Id. at 1300.
243
Smart Sys. Innovations, 873 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., dissenting).
244
Id. at 1372.
245
Id. at 1382 (Linn, J., dissenting).
239

DEC. 2018]

Software Patents

263

traffic.246 One exemplary claim, for example, recites “a computer
program product embodied on a computer readable storage medium
for processing network accounting information” through distributed
network architecture.247 As the dissent observed, nothing in the claim
recites how distributed network architecture would process network
account information.248
Other than figuring out whether a patent is directed to an abstract
concept at Alice step one, there are also practical challenges for
determining whether software patents recite an inventive concept at
step two. As a general matter, patent eligibility is a question of
law.249 It is also a threshold issue in many cases.250 Accordingly,
courts often decide patent eligibility at the pleadings stage before
hearing any expert testimony or resolving claim construction.251
Treating patent eligibility as a pure legal question, however, creates
problems at Alice step two, where the court searches for an
“inventive concept” in the claim.252 The Supreme Court has stressed
that an inventive concept must go beyond what is “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the
field.”253 But how does a court determine what is well-understood,
246

Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1313 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1299. Claim 1 recites in full:
A computer program product embodied on a computer readable storage
medium for processing network accounting information comprising:
computer code for receiving from a first source a first network
accounting record;
computer code for correlating the first network accounting record with
accounting information available from a second source; and
computer code for using the accounting information with which the first
network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network
accounting record.
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routine and conventional? That inquiry necessarily depends on the
state of the technology at the time of invention and requires courts
to make factual determinations about the type of activity “engaged
in by those in the field.”254
Recognizing this problem, the Federal Circuit recently held
Alice step two can include subsidiary factual issues.255 In Berkheimer
v. HP Inc., the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment of invalidity under § 101.256 The patent was directed to a
process of storing digital files “without substantial redundancy.”257
The court held “[w]hether something is well-understood, routine,
and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a
factual determination.”258 And because the patent contends the
claimed function “improves system operating efficiency and
reduces storage costs,” the court found “there is at least a genuine
issue of material fact” as to whether the patents are directed to an
improvement in computer functionality.259 Similarly, in Aatrix
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., the court vacated the
district court’s finding of invalidity because the amended complaint
alleged a claimed “data file” improved the operability of the
software.260 Based on the amended complaint, the court held it was
not proper to dismiss the claim on the pleadings.261
Treating patent eligibility as a factual issue, however, creates
complications as well. Once courts delve into what technology was
“well-understood” at the time of invention, the analysis starts to look
like an obviousness determination under § 103. And resolving
whether a claim is obvious usually requires a fact-intensive inquiry
into the differences between the claimed invention and the prior

254

Id.
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1126
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
256
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369.
257
Id. at 1370.
258
Id. at 1369.
259
Id. at 1370.
260
Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1126.
261
Id. at 1126–27.
255

DEC. 2018]

Software Patents

265

art.262 Indeed, if courts were required to conduct an obviousness-type
analysis under § 101, then it would seem incongruent to also treat
patent eligibility as a threshold issue capable of resolution on the
pleadings.
Judge Lourie recently identified some of the problems inherent
in Alice step two and even questioned whether there should “be a
step two in an abstract idea analysis at all.”263 In a concurring opinion
to the denial of en banc rehearing in Berkheimer, Judge Lourie
observed the prohibition on “computer functions [that] are ‘wellunderstood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to
the industry . . . is essentially a §§ 102 and 103 inquiry.”264 He
further noted that, regardless of whether step two is treated as a
question of fact or law, the decision will ultimately “not work us out
of the current Section 101 dilemma,” and the inquiry “digs the hole
deeper by further complicating the Section 101 analysis.”265
As Judge Lourie’s opinion points out, the § 101 inquiry has
become complex and unwieldy. The issue can be especially hard to
resolve for the PTO, where patent examiners must decide whether a
claimed invention was “routine and conventional” without access to
discovery or expert testimony. To help guide this endeavor, the
Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy issued a
memo in 2018 that instructed examiners to rely on four sources to
determine whether an idea is routine.266 They are: (1) the express
statement of the patent applicant; (2) court decisions; (3) a
publication like a book or manual; or (4) official notice based on
personal knowledge.267 The last source, official notice, should only
262
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be used where the examiner is certain the claimed method is “widely
prevalent or in common use.”268 Practically speaking, however,
figuring out if something is “widely prevalent or in common use”
sounds like another way of asking whether the idea would have been
especially obvious to those in the field.
C. Addressing Functional Software Claims through Section 101
Despite Judge Mayer’s insistence that Alice sounded the death
knell for software patents, at least some software patents remain
valid.269 But, as the previous section explains, figuring out which
software patents are eligible requires wading into a morass of
seemingly conflicting judicial decisions. And from a practical
perspective, the Alice two-step test is hard to administer because it
can encompass factual inquiries even though it is ostensibly a
threshold issue.
This section looks at the Alice inquiry for software patents at a
different angle. Instead of resolving whether claims recite
“improvements on computer technology” or implement an abstract
idea on generic computers, it focuses on how judicial concerns about
functional software claims influence post-Alice decisions under
§ 101. Although viewing the issue from this perspective does not
resolve every conceptual difficulty regarding software patents, it
should at least clarify the current judicial approach to patent
eligibility for software.
To start, there is general consensus that functional claim
language is at least relevant to the § 101 inquiry post-Alice. In
Electric Power Group, the Federal Circuit observed that “essentially
result-focused, functional character of claim language has been a
frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101, especially in
the area of using generic computer and network technology to carry
out economic transactions.”270 Similarly, the court in Finjan v. Blue
268

Id. at 3.
See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“Nor do we think that claims directed to software, as opposed to hardware,
are inherently abstract and therefore only properly analyzed at the second step of
the Alice analysis.”).
270
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
269

DEC. 2018]

Software Patents

267

Coat Systems announced that a result “is not itself patentable.”271
Even in Amdocs, which upheld the validity of the challenged
patents, the majority acknowledged that functional claiming could
be “a helpful way of double-checking” whether an invention is
directed to an abstract idea or “an inventive concept in
application.”272
But beyond recognizing its relevance, courts cannot agree on a
specific approach to functional software claims under § 101. Some
decisions treat software functions as inherently abstract.273
Accordingly, if the claims use purely functional language, then the
patent likely fails § 101 regardless of what the specification
discloses.274 This approach “would save the patent’s eligibility under
§ 101 only if the claim at issue itself explicitly states the necessary
‘means’” to perform the claimed function.275 By contrast, other
decisions do not foreclose functional claiming altogether under
§ 101. Instead, they look to the patent specification to determine if
the claimed function relies on a patent-eligible technological
solution.276 Under this latter approach, purely functional software
claims can still survive § 101 scrutiny so long as the specification
discloses technological improvements to perform the claimed
function—even if those improvements are not expressly claimed.
To illustrate this distinction, I return to my hypothetical example
of an inventor who creates a propeller plane, but broadly claims “a
271

Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); see also McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We therefore look to whether the claims in these
patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology
or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely
invoke generic processes and machinery.”).
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Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356.
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McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314 (“A patent may issue ‘for the means or method of
producing a certain result, or effect, and not for the result or effect produced.’”)
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 n.7 (1981)).
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Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1295.
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machine that applies Bernoulli’s principle to fly.” Under the first
approach, we would treat the function of “applying Bernoulli’s
principle to fly” as an abstract idea. As a result, the claim is
ineligible because it recites an abstract function, but is silent on how
the invention applies Bernoulli’s principle, what components are
used, or how those components are assembled. By contrast, the
second approach looks beyond the claims to the specification, which
discloses a design for a propeller plane. Thus, the patent provides a
non-abstract, mechanical device that applies Bernoulli’s principle to
fly. As a result, the claim is not abstract under the second approach
because it captures the inventor’s specific technological
improvement.277
For its part, the Federal Circuit has yet to settle on one approach
over the other. For example, Apple v. Ameranth reflects the first
approach, in which software functions are considered inherently
abstract.278 There, the court invalidated a patent that disclosed a
system for generating and transmitting menus that could be used in
restaurants.279 In doing so, the court observed “[t]he patents claim
systems including menus with particular features. They do not claim
a particular way of programming or designing the software to create
menus that have these features, but instead merely claim the
resulting systems. Essentially, the claims are directed to certain
functionality . . . .”280 Further, the court dismissed the specification’s
disclosure of programming details—the means for accomplishing
the claimed function—as “immaterial because these details are not
recited in the actual claims.”281 Similarly, in Affinity Labs v. Amazon,
the Court invalidated claims that “describe a desired function or
outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines the
claim to a particular solution to an identified problem. The purely
277

See, e.g., Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1303 (“The collection, filtering, aggregating,
and completing steps all depend upon the invention’s unique distributed
architecture—the same architecture outlined in our earlier analysis of the ‘065
patent. An understanding of how this is accomplished is only possible through an
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functional nature of the claim confirms that it is directed to an
abstract idea, not to a concrete embodiment of that idea.”282
By contrast, other Federal Circuit decisions look beyond the
claim language to determine whether the patent is directed to a nonabstract technological improvement.283 For example, in Visual
Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., the court upheld claims directed to
a computer memory system with “programmable operational
characteristics that can be tailored for use with multiple different
processors . . . .”284 The claims, however, said nothing about the
“programmable operational characteristic,” other than stating that it
“determines a type of data stored by said cache.”285 Even though the
claim described the computer memory system by its function, the
court nevertheless found it patent-eligible in part because the patent
disclosed code to perform the claimed function.286
Similarly, the court in Amdocs upheld the challenged patent
because the claimed functions “all depend upon the invention’s
unconventional distributed architecture,” which can only be
understood “through an examination of the claims in light of the
written description.”287 There, the claims recited functions like
“collecting network communications usage information” and
“storing the plurality of data records in a database.”288 But instead of
focusing only on the functional nature of the claims, the court looked
beyond the claim language and relied on portions of the
specification that disclosed a “distributed architecture” to perform
these functions.289 Amdocs also expressly rejected the notion that a
function, or a “desired goal,” is always an abstract idea.290 The court
refused to “focus[] on the difference between ‘means’ and ‘ends,’”
282

Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
283
Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2017); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed.
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and argued that such an approach would conflate means-plusfunction practice under § 112(f) with the § 101 analysis.291 “That is
not now the law, either in statute or in court decision,” contended
the majority in Amdocs.292
The same dispute about functional software claiming is also
manifest at Alice step two, where the court must search for an
inventive concept.293 At step two, the issue is whether reciting a
software function is sufficient to transform an otherwise abstract
concept into a patentable application.294 In Berkheimer, the claim
recited “[a] method of archiving an item in a computer processing
system” wherein object structures are stored “in the archive without
substantial redundancy.”295 At the pleading stage, the Federal Circuit
held there was a factual dispute as to whether “storing a reconciled
object structure in the archive without substantial redundancy”
represents an inventive concept.296 In doing so, the court cited the
specification’s disclosure of a system that reduces redundancy by
analyzing the variations between archived objects and linking
common text and graphical elements.297 Because the claims recite
the function of storing objects “without substantial redundancy,” the
court found the claim language “capture[d] these improvements”
described in the specification.298
This approach to Alice step two drew a sharp dissent from Judge
Reyna in the denial of petition for en banc rehearing in
Berkheimer.299 In his dissent, Judge Reyna stressed that the search
for an “inventive concept . . . is predominately a legal question
focused on the claims.”300 That is, “the claim ha[s] to supply a ‘new
and useful’ application of the idea in order to be patent eligible.”301
291
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Although not stated explicitly, the dissent implies that a claim
cannot “capture” a specific technological improvement just by
stating its function.302 Instead, the claim would likely need to recite
the actual means for performing the claimed function.
Regardless of whether the issue is framed as an inquiry under
step one or two, the basic disagreement centers on whether claims
directed to software functions are inherently abstract, or if they can
pass § 101 based on technological improvements described in the
specification. On one hand, it makes sense that courts should look
to the specification to determine what the invention covers. After
all, terms like “programmable operational characteristic” are largely
meaningless unless they are placed in context. Likewise, where the
patent describes detailed algorithms for achieving an improvement
in computer technology, it seems reasonable to rely on that
description to determine whether the claim is abstract.
The problem, however, is that even if the specification provides
detailed or groundbreaking algorithms to improve computer
technology, the claims ultimately cover broad functions like
“determin[ing] a type of data stored by said cache” and “storing a
reconciled object structure in the archive without substantial
redundancy.”303 These functions could be performed by any number
of algorithms, and there is no guarantee the claim would be limited
to what is disclosed in the specification.304 To the contrary, claim
terms with broad plain meanings are generally not limited to the
disclosed embodiments.305 As a result, the claims can still be asserted
against totally different algorithms that perform the same functions.
Because of this dilemma, some practitioners have urged
Congress to adopt a compromise solution based on § 112(f).306
Under this proposal, courts would rely on the specification to
determine whether a claimed software function is patent-eligible,
302
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while also limiting the scope of functional software claims to the
disclosed embodiments.307 Although this idea makes sense in theory,
there are practical hurdles to implementing this type of solution for
software patents, particularly for Article III courts. The next section
discusses this proposal as well as other legislative amendments
aimed at providing more clarity to the § 101 analysis.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
With broad dissatisfaction at the current state of the law on
patent eligibility, attention has once again turned to Congress for a
legislative fix. Proponents of legislative reform argue that legislative
action is required to overturn the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Mayo and Alice, which they believe to be recent distortions in patent
law.308 One patent bar association, for example, contend that
legislative action is needed to “return the law to what the 1952
Patent Act meant to provide.”309
In reality, redrafting the statutory definition of patent-eligible
subject matter is an unprecedented step that would likely go beyond
abrogating Mayo and Alice. The statutory language of § 101 has
remained largely unchanged since the Patent Act of 1793, which
established the categories of patentable subject matter.310 Those
categories were in turn derived from contemporaneous English
standards for patent eligibility.311 In short, the statutory definition of
patentable subject matter has always been broadly drawn, and the
standard has developed largely through common law.312 If any of the
leading proposals are enacted, it would be the first time that
Congress intervened to dramatically broaden patentable subject
matter.
307
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That is not to say Congress should reject a legislative fix just
because the statutory language has not been changed before.
Proponents of reform correctly note that Alice’s two-step standard
is nebulous and difficult to apply.313 And it may also seem absurd
that courts should rely on statutory language crafted in the early
Industrial era to evaluate patents covering smart-phones and selfdriving cars. Nevertheless, Congress must approach legislative
reform with a clear understanding of why courts are invalidating so
many software patents under the current statutory definition of
patentable subject matter. As the previous section describes, a key
question is whether software functions are inherently abstract.
This section will review the current leading proposed legislative
amendments to § 101 and explain why they fail to address the
underlying issue of functional software claims. It will also consider
whether courts can narrowly construe functional software claims to
cover only the specific algorithms or programming described in the
specification, which is similar to the current approach under
§ 112(f). This section argues that although such a proposal might
work in theory, it presents practical difficulties for courts because it
requires guidelines on what types of algorithms and programs are
definite enough to support the claimed functions.
A. Proposed Legislative Amendments
Proposals to amend § 101 have emerged from various bar and
patent owner groups, including the American Bar Association
(ABA) Section of IP law, the American Intellectual Property Law
Association (AIPLA), and the Intellectual Property Owners
Association (IPO).314 Although the details might differ, the proposed
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, Joint AIPLA–IPO Proposal on Patent
Eligibility,
at
2,
https://www.aipla.org/docs/defaultsource/uploadedfiles/documents/resources2/reports/2017aipladirect/documents/a
ipla-report-on-101-reform-5-19-17-errata.pdf?sfvrsn=138c9ce7_1 (last accessed
Aug. 3, 2018) [hereinafter JOINT AIPLA–IPO PROPOSAL] (“The Federal Circuit,
the district courts, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are all struggling to
find a principled formula to guide their decision-making . . . .”).
314
Id.; Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, American Bar Association
Section of Intellectual Property Law, to the Hon. Michelle K. Lee, Director of the
USPTO (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
313
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amendments all aim to abrogate the two-step test established by
Mayo and Alice. Likewise, most proposals attempt to carve out
functional claiming considerations from the patent eligibility
analysis.
In June 2018, Congress introduced the Restoring America’s
Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, which incorporates the
AIPLA-IPO joint proposal nearly verbatim.315 AIPLA-IPO’s joint
proposal would add two sub-sections to § 101.316 Section 101(b)
specifies that an invention is ineligible “only if the claimed
invention as a whole exists in nature independent of and prior to any
human activity, or can be performed solely in the human mind.”317
Under the proposed amendment, any “result of human actions as
applied to nature” would be patent-eligible.318
Proposed § 101(c) states that eligibility “shall be determined
without regard to without regard to the requirements or conditions
of sections 102, 103, and 112 of this title, the manner in which the
claimed invention was made or discovered, or whether the claimed

/administrative/intellectual_property_law/advocacy/advocacy-20170328comments.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA Proposal].
315
Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, H.R. 6264,
115th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2018).
316
Under the proposed IPO–AIPLA amendment, § 101 would read:
(a) Whoever invents or discovers, and claims as an invention,
any useful process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or any useful improvement thereof, shall be entitled to
a patent therefor, subject only to the conditions and
requirements set forth in this title.
(b) A claimed invention is ineligible under subsection (a) if and
only if the claimed invention as a whole (i) exists in nature
independently of and prior to any human activity or (ii) is
performed solely in the human mind.
(c) The eligibility of a claimed invention under subsections (a)
and (b) shall be determined without regard to: (i) the
requirements or conditions of sections 102, 103, and 112 of this
title; (ii) the manner in which the claimed invention was made
or discovered; or (iii) whether the claimed invention includes
an inventive concept.
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invention includes an inventive concept.”319 Instead of relying on
§ 101 to invalidate patents, § 101(c) would “return the inquiry to
well-developed legal principles” for patentability developed under
other sections of the patent statute.320 The goal is to “stop decision
makers from confusing the patent eligibility inquiry with the
enablement, written description, and definiteness inquiries under
Section 112.”321 The AIPLA criticized the Supreme Court for
“confus[ing] its own early cases, which repeatedly compare the
scope of claims to the scope of patent disclosures to determine
whether claims are in fact too broad, an inquiry required by the
enablement and written description requirements.”322
The AIPLA-IPO proposal represents a fairly radical change to
patentable subject matter. Not only would it abrogate Mayo and
Alice, but it also undercuts the reasoning in seminal nineteenth
century cases like Morse. Because the amendment limits abstract
ideas to activities “performed solely in the human mind,” any
computer implementation of an abstract idea, no matter how routine,
would likely be patentable. After all, a hard-drive containing a
program for hedging risk does not “exist in nature,” nor can it be
“performed solely in the human mind.” Likewise, Samuel Morse’s
claim for using electric current to generate characters or signs at a
remote location would also be patent-eligible, since this process
cannot be performed solely in the human mind either.323
Although the AIPLA-IPO proposal is likely easier to apply than
the current Alice two-step test, it does not resolve the underlying
concern that software patents can be used to circumvent the judicial
prohibition on patenting abstract ideas. In the modern world, few
business processes or financial transactions are performed without
computers. Accordingly, taking an abstract idea like intermediated
settlement and reciting “apply it on the computer” does not impose
any meaningful limitations to the abstract idea itself.324 Simply
stated, a patent that covers “intermediated settlement on a computer”
319
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has essentially the same scope as a patent on “intermediated
settlement” generally. And contrary to the AIPLA-IPO’s
suggestion, it is far from clear that other patentability requirements
could address this problem. After all, a claim on a revolutionary new
type of intermediated settlement may be well-defined and readily
implemented on a computer. Thus, the claim may very well satisfy
the requirements of §§ 112, 102 and 103. Yet such a claim might
still preempt a basic business practice.
Compared to the AIPLA-IPO joint proposal, the ABA’s
proposal to amend § 101 is more modest.325 The ABA’s proposal
would add another subsection to § 101 under which a patent
application may be “denied eligibility under this section 101 on the
ground that the scope of the exclusive rights under such a claim
would preempt the use by others of all practical applications of a
law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.”326 In a letter to
the PTO Director, the ABA noted “the consistency with which the
Court states that its fundamental concern is the potential ‘preemption’ of the use of building blocks like laws of nature, natural
phenomenon and abstract ideas . . . . At its core, preemption is the
325

ABA Proposal, supra note 314.
Id. at 3. Under the ABA’s proposed amendment, § 101 would read:
a) Eligible Subject Matter – Whoever invents or discovers any useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any useful
improvement thereof, shall be entitled to obtain a patent on such
invention or discovery, absent a finding that one or more conditions or
requirements under this title have not been met.
b) Exception – A claim for a useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, may be
denied eligibility under this section 101 on the ground that the scope of
the exclusive rights under such a claim would preempt the use by others
of all practical applications of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
abstract idea. Patent eligibility under this section shall not be negated
when a practical application of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
abstract idea is the subject matter of the claims upon consideration of
those claims as a whole, whereby each and every limitation of the claims
shall be fully considered and none ignored. Eligibility under this section
101 shall not be negated based on considerations of patentability as
defined in Sections 102, 103 and 112, including whether the claims in
whole or in part define an inventive concept.
Id. at 3–4.
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driving force behind the Court’s jurisprudence.”327 Unlike the
AIPLA-IPO joint proposal, the ABA proposal would preserve the
courts’ ability to invalidate patents that are directed to a computer,
but nevertheless preempt an abstract idea.
The ABA proposal, however, attempts to limit judicial authority
over patentable subject matter in other respects. The proposed
amendment requires courts and the PTO to “fully consider[] . . .
each and every limitation of the claims.”328 And it prohibits courts
from negating patent eligibility based on “consideration of those
claims” as a whole.329 This section seems to address the Alice twostep test, which requires the court to resolve what the claim is
“directed to” as a whole.330 Nevertheless, the amendment is unclear
because it does not specify what patentable weight courts must
assign to each limitation. Even under the current two-step standard,
it would be unusual, and likely improper, for a court to ignore claim
limitations entirely. For example, the patent in Alice implemented a
method of intermediated settlement on a computer.331 The Supreme
Court held the claim was “directed to . . . a method of exchanging
financial obligations . . . .”332 In doing so, the Court still considered
the computer implementation step, but found that it was not “enough
for patent eligibility.”333 Accordingly, it is not immediately clear
how the ABA proposal would actually alter the Alice step two
inquiry.
Like the AIPLA-IPO proposal, the ABA’s proposed amendment
also tries to separate § 101 from other patentability requirements.
The ABA’s proposal states that “[e]ligibility under this section 101
shall not be negated based on considerations of patentability as
defined in Sections 102, 103 and 112, including whether the claims
in whole or in part define an inventive concept.”334 According to the
ABA, “[t]he proposal at least substantially mitigates if not resolves
327
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newly injected ambiguity and confusion into the eligibility
determination caused by the use of factors that are relevant only to
novelty, obviousness, and the requirements of particularity in
claiming an invention.”335
This represents a flawed approach to functional claims.
Prohibiting courts from considering the requirements or conditions
of § 112 presumes that courts are doing so in the first place. This
presumption misunderstands why courts invalidate functional
software claims. Courts do so because they consider software
functions to be inherently abstract, not because the claims are
unclear in scope or lack written description support. Under this
view, a software function represents the idea of performing tasks on
generic computer components without actually explaining how to
do it. They are the digital equivalent of “a machine that applies
Bernoulli’s principle to fly.” Although functional claims might also
raise § 112 issues, that does not mean they are otherwise eligible
under § 101. Therefore, even if Congress adopts the ABA’s
proposal, courts could continue to invalidate functional software
claims under the standard set forth by Bilski and Alice.
B. Extending the Legislative Compromise under Section 112 (f) to
Patent Eligibility
Ultimately, the AIPLA-IPO and ABA proposals do not resolve
underlying disputes about functional software claims, nor do they
address judicial concerns that such claims will hinder innovation.
As an alternative, some have proposed tackling functional software
claiming more directly by incorporating the requirements of § 112(f)
into the patent eligibility determination.336 Under this alternative
approach, if a patent recites an ineligible software function, then
courts will limit the claim to whatever software code or algorithms
are disclosed in the embodiments.337 As one commentator argues,
“[p]reemption concerns [under Section 101] may be addressed
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adequately by disclosure-based limits on claim scope, rather than by
precluding patentability in toto.”338
One way to implement this proposal is through legislative
amendment. For example, the existing language of § 112(f) could
be appended to a new subsection under § 101. This subsection
would state that “[a] claim directed to a judicially-recognized
exception . . . shall be construed to cover the structures, materials,
or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof . . . .”339
A legislative fix, however, may be unnecessary if courts take a more
expansive approach of means-plus-function claims. Section 112(f)
applies to claims that recite “a specified function without the recital
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.”340 This language
could theoretically cover a wide swath of functional software claims
that courts have found ineligible under § 101. Stated differently, if a
claim would otherwise run afoul of § 101 because it is drafted in a
purely functional manner, courts could find that such a claim
invokes § 112(f) and narrowly construe the claim to the disclosed
embodiments only.
The trend towards relaxing the standard for construing claims as
means-plus-function terms already started with the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Williamson, which overturned the strong presumption
that patentees only invoke § 112(f) if they use specific language like
“means for.”341 Presently, however, the impact of Williamson is
likely blunted by the courts’ willingness to invalidate functional
software claims under § 101 altogether without reaching the
§ 112(f) question. Courts could invoke § 112 to address judicial
concerns about overbroad or vague software patents, instead of
invalidating such claims under § 101.
There are several benefits to limiting functional software claims
to the disclosed embodiments. First, narrowing functional software
claim to a specific algorithm would make the claim less abstract.
The Federal Circuit has reasoned that claims which are limited to a
specific means for performing a claimed function are more likely to
338
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be patent-eligible.342 For example, in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
the Federal Circuit held that a claim directed to storing tabular data
was patent-eligible in part because the claim expressly used meansplus-function language.343 Thus, “the claims are not simply directed
to any form of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically
directed to a self-referential table for a computer database.”344 The
patent did not involve just “general-purpose computer components
[that] are added post-hoc to a fundamental economic practice or
mathematical equation. Rather, the claims are directed to a specific
implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts.
Accordingly, [the court found] the claims at issue are not directed to
an abstract idea.”345
Second, this proposed approach would address concerns about
preemption that underpin judicial decisions on patent eligibility. In
Morse, the Supreme Court invalidated Morse’s patent for using
electric current to generate characters or signs at a remote location
because, for the purposes of infringement, “it matters not by what
process or machinery the result is accomplished.”346 Likewise, the
Court in Alice observed that allowing patentees to “claim any
principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer
system configured to implement the relevant concept” would
broadly preempt the future use of those concepts.347 Limiting the
claims to the algorithms and code described in the specification
would obviate these concerns. In Morse, the patent would only cover
the process and machines that Samuel Morse invented and
disclosed.348 If a subsequent inventor develops a better telegraph,
they would not be liable for infringement. Likewise, the patent in
Alice would only cover any specific algorithms for intermediated
settlement described in the specification.
342
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Third, limiting the scope of functional software claims would
also resolve the competing judicial approaches to functional
software claims. As described in Section IV.C, some cases have held
software functions are inherently abstract, such that a patent reciting
purely functional language will fail § 101 regardless of what the
specification discloses.349 By contrast, other cases look to the patent
specification to determine if the claimed function is performed with
patent-eligible technology.350 The proposed approach represents a
compromise between these two lines of cases. Courts and the PTO
must rely on the specification to determine if the claim is eligible,
and, therefore, will not invalidate a claim simply because it recites a
function or end result. On the other hand, functional software claims
will be restricted in scope and cannot cover algorithms for
performing the claimed function that are not disclosed in the
specification.
Despite these possible benefits, this approach may prove
difficult for Article III courts to apply in practice. Section 112(f) is
premised on the idea that courts can identify a corresponding
structure or process in the specification to perform the claimed
function. For software claims, the corresponding structure or
process is usually an algorithm or software object.351 The problem,
however, is that algorithms and software objects are essentially
logical procedures for performing tasks.352 At bottom, they are still
a series of functions. As Professor Kevin Collins observes, software
“[a]lgorithms are recursive entities: algorithms have sub-algorithms,
which have sub-sub-algorithms, etc.”353 In short, “software is
functional all the way down.”354
Given the recursive nature of software, courts must find a level
of abstraction that satisfies § 101 and § 112(f). In other words,
courts must “identify a bottom as a matter of policy—a level of
generality below which a functional property of a software program

349

See supra Section IV.C.
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counts as metaphorical structure . . . .”355 This should be possible in
theory. According to Professor Mark Lemley, there are “wellunderstood class[es] of software objects” that could serve as the
metaphorical “structure.”356 He further notes that the same
theoretical problem exists in more conventional claims. That is, “[a]
jackhammer functions too, but we have no trouble distinguishing the
function it performs from the way in which it performs that function.
The same can be said of software.”357
Although it is likely possible to identify an “acceptable” level of
abstraction for software functions, it remains an open question as to
whether courts are institutionally equipped to do so. Professor
Collins expressed doubt that an Article III court is capable of
resolving this question with any consistency.358 He notes this inquiry
would “require consultation with computer scientists to create a
taxonomy of a variety of levels of abstraction at which the functional
properties of a software program can be formulated.”359 And it would
also require courts “to identify the level of abstraction at which
algorithmic descriptions of software become sufficiently specific to
count as the descriptions of the metaphorical structure of software
inventions.”360 From an institutional standpoint, courts have
questioned their own ability to resolve this type of policy question.
In Benson, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he technological
problems tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to us that
considered action by the Congress is needed.”361 The Court in Flook
noted how Congress should rely on empirical data to resolve
“[d]ifficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs
that may be appropriate for patent protection and the form and
duration.”362
From an institutional standpoint, the PTO is likely better suited
to establish guidelines on what types of software algorithms connote
355
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structure and which are merely functions.363 The PTO already
employs thousands of employees, many of whom possess relevant
scientific and technical training.364 Likewise, the agency has
divisions dedicated to economic research and analysis that could
evaluate the impact of whatever guidelines it develops regarding
software patents.365 While giving this problem to the PTO seems
sensible, the agency currently lacks legal authority to interpret
§ 101.366 As a result, the PTO cannot promulgate legally binding
rules on what types of software algorithms or functions are
sufficiently concrete.367 Whether the PTO should be given
substantive rulemaking authority over § 101 remains a contentious
topic and is beyond the scope of this article.368 Opponents of giving
substantive rulemaking authority to the PTO express concerns about
institutional competence and agency capture.369 But at least for
finding a workable approach to functional software claims, the PTO
is likely best suited to resolve the proper level of abstraction for
software.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Nearly two centuries of judicial decisions have expressed policy
concerns about functional claims. And while Congress tried to
resolve this issue in the 1952 Patent Act, the advent of generalpurpose computers raised new and unforeseen questions about
functional claiming that courts are still grappling with. After Alice,
the preferred solution among many judges is to invalidate functional
software claims altogether. Reasonable minds might differ on
whether this approach is a faithful application of § 101 and § 112.
Nevertheless, these decisions reflect legitimate policy concerns
about whether patentees can use functional software claiming to
improperly tie up abstract ideas. Legislative action to address
patentable subject matter should not ignore these concerns. And yet,
the current set of proposed amendments to § 101 would dramatically
limit judicial discretion without resolving questions about the
preemptive effects of software patents. Moreover, by rigidifying the
patent eligibility standard, the proposed legislative reforms could
leave courts and the PTO less capable of contending with issues
raised by new and unforeseen technological developments.

